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Graham on behalf of the Ngadju People v State of Western Australia [2012] FCA 1003

Year
2012
Jurisdiction
Western Australia
Forum
Federal Court
Legislation considered
s 84 Native Title Act 1993 (Cth)
Summary

Marshall J

The Federal Court dismissed applications by Mr Laing, Mr Lawrie and Ms Miller, who each sought to be joined as respondents to the Ngadju native title claim. Under s 84(5) of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), a person may be added as a party to proceedings, if their interests may be affected by the determination and it is in the interests of justice to do so.

Background

The Ngadju claim area covers over 100,000 square kilometres in Western Australia. An agreement in 1996 between the Ngadju and Mirning peoples resolved a border overlap on the eastern border of the current Ngadju claim and the western border of the Mirning claim. Mr Lawrie and Ms Miller, applicants for the original Mirning claim lodged in 1995, sought to be joined as respondent parties, in order to protect Mirning land and interests in the Ngadju claim area. Mr Laing was the applicant for the Naley claim, which was filed in April 2012 and dismissed on 7 September 2012 (Laing v State of South Australia (No 2) [2012] FCA 980). He argued that his descendants maintained a physical and spiritual connection to Mirning lands and that Mirning sites and country extended into the Ngadju claim area.

Decision

Marshall J emphasised that the Court has discretion to determine whether or not a party should be added to proceedings and that, in this case, the interlocutory applications were made too late. The Ngadju claim had already progressed to an advanced stage, as evidence had been heard, final written submissions filed and the parties were due to address the Court on 24 September 2012. Mr Laing, Mr Lawrie and Ms Miller provided no explanation for their delay in making an application and, as Marshall J stated, allowing them to join the proceedings would ‘severely jeopardise the efficient conduct of the trial.’

Marshall J acknowledged that even if there was substantial delay, it may still be appropriate to allow an application. However, in this case, the applicants were relying on ‘skeletal affidavits’ and had not filed any extensive evidence.